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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE  
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

*the national security  
organization*



*A Report to the Congress*

FEBRUARY 1949

# The National Security Organization

*A report to the Congress by the Commission on  
Organization of the Executive Branch of  
the Government, February 1949*

**The Commission on Organization of The  
Executive Branch of the Government**

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### Letter of Transmittal

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
15 February 1949.

DEAR SIRs: In accordance with Public Law 162, Eightieth Congress, approved July 7, 1947, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government submits herewith its report on the National Security Organization, and, separately, as appendix G, a part of the report of the task force assigned to examine this segment of the executive branch.

Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, a member of this Commission, took no part in the preparation or consideration of this report.

The Commission wishes to express its appreciation for the work of its task force and for the cooperation of the members of the National Security Organization and other departments and agencies concerned with this report.

Respectfully,



*Chairman.*

*The Honorable*

*The President of the Senate.*

*The Honorable*

*The Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

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## The National Security Organization

World conditions demand that the United States maintain a strong National Security Organization.

This need results directly from the total disruption of the old balance of power among nations, and from new forms of communications and warfare which have impaired America's ocean-moated isolation. Ours is a need for defense and our military strength must be predicated upon the degree of menace which we face. At present outlook, the United States' need for a strong Military Establishment is obvious.

In the past, the United States has maintained merely a nominal Army and Air Force, and its Navy has been sharply limited. The assumption was that war, and international crises which could result in war, would be rare and that there would always be ample time to build a strong military force around this permanent cadre. Now the United States, in the forefront of world affairs, must continuously deal with political and economic pressures.

The maintenance of a huge military force and of enormous military budgets in peacetime poses a severe problem. It introduces a new element into our social and political life; this spending, both as a drain on the taxpayers and as purchasing power, can vitally affect our economy. The degree

**NOTE.** Secretary of Defense James Forrestal took no part in the preparation or consideration of this report.

of our success in achieving efficiency of military operations and planning, economy in execution, and proper relationship of this new force to our political and economic fabric can make the difference between democracy and totalitarianism, both for our Nation, and for the whole world.

Military strength and efficiency is important, but it is only one element of national security. National strength depends upon economic, political, and human values. We must, therefore, assure ourselves that the military arm of Government, in its new strength, will not grow up as a thing apart. In particular, it must be unequivocally under the direction of the executive branch and fully accountable to the President, the Congress, and the people.

Throughout its history, the United States has been fearful of military cliques and has thrown up safeguards against this threat to democratic government. Under the Constitution, we have subordinated the military to civilian control by making the President Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and by installing civilian secretaries to direct the departments.

The pressure of events has resulted in a budget of approximately \$15,000,000,000 in the current fiscal year, more than a third of all Federal appropriations, and large military budgets must be the expectation for the immediate future. Under these circumstances, the Nation must make very sure that means of exercising civilian control are strong and effective. We repeat, that under these circumstances, we must hold the military rigidly accountable to the President, the Congress, and the people. We must do this not only to safeguard our

democratic traditions against militarism, but to insure that military policy shall be in close accord with national needs and national welfare; and also to insure that the huge military budget shall be used with efficiency, and that costs shall be commensurate with actual needs without damaging or destroying our national economy.

At present, we can be sure of none of these things.



## What is Wrong with the Present Organization

The National Security Organization, as legislated in 1947 to establish unification of the armed services and unified national policy on security, has achieved gains. Further improvement may be expected since the organization is still young, but there is evidence that the utmost that can be accomplished under the present statute will fall far short of national needs.

The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch has had the benefit of an investigation into the National Security Organization by a distinguished committee. The committee found continued disharmony and lack of unified planning. Extravagance in military budgets and waste in military expenditure show a serious lack of understanding of the effect of military costs and spending upon the total economy. True national security depends more upon economic stability and political strength than upon military power.

Interservice rivalries indicate a lack of understanding of the fact that military security depends upon cooperation and balance among the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and upon the creation of a genuinely unified military arm. There is a lack of close working relationships among such important elements as the Research and Development Board

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Some part of these weaknesses undoubtedly can be traced to the newness of the operation, but the Commission believes that they show serious organizational defects. The lack of central authority in the direction of the National Military Establishment, the rigid statutory structure established under the act, and divided responsibility, have resulted in a failure to assert clear civilian control over the armed forces.

### **Over-All Department Management**

In our first report we have urged that the foundation of good departmental administration requires that the Secretary have authority from the Congress to organize and control his organization, and that separate authorities to component subordinates be eliminated.

In our Report on the Budget we propose a new form of "performance" budget for all departments. We also propose that each department or agency keep its own administrative accounts in the manner prescribed by an Accountant General in the Treasury and subject to the approval and audit of the Comptroller General.<sup>1</sup> The Commission also recommends that personnel recruitment be performed by the Department (except possibly in the lower grades), subject to standards and methods of merit selection to be proposed by the Department, but with the approval and enforcement of the Civil Service Commission.<sup>2</sup> The Commission likewise

<sup>1</sup> Report on Budgeting and Accounting.

<sup>2</sup> Report on Personnel Management.

recommends elsewhere that the procurement of supplies peculiar to the Department be decentralized into the Department, under standards and methods established in the Office of General Services.<sup>8</sup> The items of common use would of course be handled by the latter office. Further, we propose that the Department should strengthen its management research unit, working in cooperation with a comparable staff unit under the Office of the Budget.<sup>4</sup>

### Civilian Control and Accountability

In its study of the executive branch the Commission has established certain principles that must underlie systems of organization in order to assure the three essentials of good Government management: efficiency, economy, and clear accountability to the Congress and the people.

These principles call for centralization of authority and control in the President and the department heads, for clear lines of command and accountability, and for provision of adequate staff for policy formulation and for supervision of operation. Without these, the President and the department heads cannot exercise positive control and hence cannot be held responsible by the Congress and the people for failures or deficiencies of performance.

In the establishment of the present organization for national security, these principles have been repeatedly violated.

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<sup>8</sup> Report on the Office of General Services.

<sup>4</sup> Report on General Management of the Executive Branch.

*a.* The President's authority has been curtailed by statutory stipulation of the membership and duties of both the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board—the Cabinet committees concerned with vital defense policies.

*b.* The authority of the Secretary of Defense, and hence the control of the President, is weak and heavily qualified by the provisions of the act of 1947 which set up a rigid structure of federation rather than unification.

*c.* In direct proportion to the limitations and confusions of authority among their civilian superiors, the military are left free of civilian control.

The Commission's report on departmental management<sup>5</sup> has pointed out the weaknesses and fallacies of a department in which statutory authority is delegated to subordinate units, and the department head is left with only the most general supervisory powers over policies, operations, and budgets. In such cases, the department head cannot enforce consistent policies and obtain the necessary efficiency and economy. Nor can he be held strictly accountable since he lacks authority to carry out the mandates of determined policy. The National Military Establishment as set up under the act of 1947, is perilously close to the weakest type of department.

The Secretary of Defense, at present, has only "general" authority over the service departments—the Army, Navy, and Air Force. He cannot hire and fire subordinates except on

<sup>5</sup> See report on General Management of the Executive Branch.

his immediate staff. Almost all appointive power not in the President's hands is in that of the subordinate service secretaries. The powers of the Secretary of Defense over the budget for the National Military Establishment, and over expenditures, are inadequate. He is inadequately provided with staff and has no authority to reorganize the Establishment, most of whose machinery is rigidly prescribed by statute.

The principle of federation, rather than firm unification, is implicit in the statutory provision that "all powers and duties relating to such departments (the Army, Navy, and Air Force) and not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense" are reserved to the departments. The pattern does not cease at that point. Within the service departments, subordinate units—such as the Corps of Engineers in the Army insofar as its civilian functions are concerned—have direct authority from the Congress exclusive of control even by their own secretaries.

Moreover, the service secretaries are given specific authority to resist the supervision of the Secretary of Defense in budgetary matters by appealing over his head to the President or to the Director of the Budget. The service secretaries sit with the Secretary of Defense on the National Security Council and can "out vote" him in that body's deliberations. They have more staff for planning and execution and, in fact, operate as almost fully autonomous units.

Under these circumstances centralized civilian control scarcely exists. Each military branch follows its own pur-

poses and, due both to the weakness of the Defense Secretary's powers and to the confusion of authority over them, has very much a free hand. In effect, divided responsibility means no responsibility. Civilian control thus depends directly upon the Congress whose chief mechanism is the tightening or loosening of the purse strings. In the present unsatisfactory state of military budget practices and procedure, the effectiveness of this mechanism in the hands of the Congress is highly attenuated.

In the period ahead when national security will demand a large military budget, this time-honored device for subordinating the military to civilian control will be ineffective. The remedy must be sought through organization of the executive branch to establish firm lines of authority and accountability. Otherwise, civilian control will continue to be a label instead of a reality.

What is true of the National Military Establishment is equally true of the operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Three of the four members are spokesmen for separate service arms. The Secretary of Defense, and his viewpoint for the unified Establishment as a whole, is not represented in their deliberations. Thus, though the Secretary of Defense is, under the act, the principal assistant to the President, in military matters, he cannot, as a practical matter, maintain effective civilian control over this most powerful of military units. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a unit, report to two officials—the Secretary of Defense and the President. As individuals, they report to the President, the Secretary of

Defense, and the service secretaries. Each will tend to answer much more to the service secretary who is his direct superior than to the single policies of a unified Establishment.

Here, too, it is clear that divided responsibility and allegiance are tantamount to an almost complete absence of control. Under this system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are virtually a law unto themselves, as evidenced in the fact that their activities are not well-coordinated with intra-Military Establishment operations, nor with the policy work of the Cabinet councils. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, like the rest of the National Military Establishment, are not firmly under civilian control.

### Budget and Expenditure

The present budget of the armed forces represents about \$100 per capita for the Nation, as contrasted with some \$2.25 before the First World War. Our task force reports that the current preliminary budget estimates of the three military departments for the fiscal year 1950 were for more than \$30,000,000,000.

Such a budget would be justifiable only if the Nation were actually involved in warfare. It would require a sharp reduction in production for civilian consumption, precipitate the need for controls over the economy and enormously increase inflationary pressures. It reflects a lack of realistic understanding by the three military departments of the economic and social factors of national security.

Moreover, military budgets are not drawn with careful

consciousness of cost factors. For example, an examination of the 1950 budget revealed estimates requesting modernization of 102 more tanks of a certain type than the Army actually possessed. In another case, a misplaced figure added some \$30,000,000 to budget estimates.

The committee which examined into these matters for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch was unable to compare with any degree of accuracy the cost of similar functions in the three services because of varied organizational structures and differing budgetary and accounting classifications and procedures.

Firm control over the budget and over military expenditures, as authorized by the Congress, is of the utmost importance to the national economy. Full control in the hands of the Secretary of Defense, under the authority of the President, would accomplish three main purposes: (a) It would assure budgeting and spending from the standpoint of national welfare, rather than from the standpoint of service rivalries; (b) it would assure clear and direct accountability to the President, the Office of the Budget, and the Congress through a single official, and by these means would assure a budget that conformed to national policy; (c) it would provide the Secretary of Defense with a most effective mechanism for asserting civilian control over the military.

*Recommendation No. 1*

The Commission, therefore, recommends:

- a. That full power over preparation of the budget and over expenditures as authorized by the Congress be



vested in the Secretary of Defense, under the authority of the President.

*b.* That the Secretary of Defense direct and supervise a major overhaul of the entire budget system; that the budget be of a performance type with emphasis on the objectives and purposes to be accomplished rather than upon personnel, supplies, and similar classifications;<sup>6</sup> that uniform terminology, classifications, budgetary, and accounting practices be established throughout all the services along administrative lines of responsibility, so that fiscal and management responsibility go together.

Under the performance budget system, each major organizational unit with management responsibility would have to prepare, and defend before the Secretary of Defense, complete estimates for its activities on the basis of functions and performance, and therefore could be held responsible for any money it might spend. Accountability would extend to accounting for operating results and to the measurement of performance against standards set through budgetary planning and cost estimates.

Such a system would accomplish a great deal, not only for efficiency, but to establish the authority of the Secretary of Defense and hence to assure civilian control.

*c.* That the armed services be required, at least in peacetime, to keep complete, accurate, and current inventories.

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<sup>6</sup>This system of budgeting is discussed in detail in the Commission's report on Budgeting and Accounting.

## What Should Be Done To Improve Organization

The Commission calls attention to the findings of its task force report submitted separately to the Congress. The Commission is in general agreement with the conclusions and recommendations of the task force. However, the Commission feels that certain of the measures suggested by the task force for carrying out the policies need strengthening from the broader standpoint of reorganization of the entire executive branch—particularly to insure firm civilian control.

The Commission, in its first report, has recommended that all statutory restrictions on the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board which limit the authority of the President should be removed and that the President have entire discretion over their membership, assignments, and direction.

The Commission recommends that the post of Chief of Staff to the President be abolished.

### Civilian Control

Singleness of control is the essence of efficiency. The present scattering of authority is expensive, promotes rather than curtails service rivalries, and destroys the very principle of unification. Accountability is most strongly enforced when the President and the Congress, in the people's name,

can call a single official to book for his conduct of a Government operation.

*Recommendation No. 2*

Therefore the Commission makes the following recommendations:

- a.* That the principle of unified civilian control and accountability be the guiding rule for all legislation concerned with the National Military Establishment and that full authority and accountability be centered in the Secretary of Defense, subject only to the President and the Congress.
- b.* That all statutory authority now vested in the service departments, or their subordinate units, be granted directly to the Secretary of Defense, subject to the authority of the President, with further authority to delegate them as he sees fit and wise.
- c.* That the Secretary of Defense shall have full authority, subject only to the President and the Congress, to establish policies and programs.
- d.* That the service secretaries be deprived of their privilege of appeal over the head of the Secretary of Defense; that they be directly and exclusively responsible to him; that the Secretary of Defense be the sole agent reporting to the President; that the service secretaries, to clarify their positions, be designated the Under Secretaries for Army, Navy, and Air Force.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Commissioners Hoover, Flemming, Manasco, and Mead dissent from the recommendation to change the designation of the service secretaries to Under

*e.* That specific provisions be made that the three military services shall be administered by the several under secretaries subject to the full direction and authority of the Secretary of Defense.

*f.* That there shall be Joint Chiefs of Staff representing the three services, appointed by the President and subject to confirmation by the Senate and that the Secretary of Defense, with the President's approval, shall appoint a chairman to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to represent, and report to, the Secretary of Defense.<sup>2</sup>

*g.* That all administrative authority be centered in the Secretary of Defense, subject only to the authority of the President, including full and final authority over preparation of the military budget and over the expenditure of funds appropriated by the Congress.

*h.* That the Secretary be provided with an Under Secretary of Defense, who shall be his full deputy and act for him in his absence, and three assistant secretaries; and that the Secretary of Defense be empowered to set up such personal assistants to himself as he shall require to relieve him of day-to-day detail, to advise and assist him in planning and carrying out programs, and to organize this staff as he sees fit.

*i.* That full authority for the procurement and management of supplies and matériel be vested in the

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Secretaries as they believe that the importance of these positions, the magnitude of the departments, and the danger of diluting civilian control over the military at the departmental level by a change of titles, outweigh considerations favoring a change.

<sup>2</sup> Separate views of certain Commissioners are stated later.

Secretary of Defense. The Secretary can delegate this authority to the Munitions Board (or to other officers or agencies as he may determine) with directions to expedite by all possible means the elimination of costly duplication in procurement and waste in utilization among the three services. Our further recommendations regarding the coordination of military with civilian supply management are contained in the Commission's report on the Offices of General Services.

*Recommendation No. 3*

The following recommendations are made regarding personnel:

- a.* That, in line with our recommendation below for an integrated system of military personnel administration, military education, training, recruitment, promotion, and transfers among the services be put under the central direction and control of the Secretary of Defense.
- b.* That the recruitment of civilian employees should be decentralized into the National Military Establishment under standards and procedures to be approved and enforced by the Civil Service Commission.<sup>3</sup>
- c.* That full authority be vested in the Secretary of Defense, subject only to policies established by the Congress and the President, to prescribe uniform personnel policies for civilian and military personnel throughout the several services.

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<sup>3</sup> See the Commission's report on Personnel Management.

## Teamwork

### *Recommendation No. 4*

Teamwork and coordination throughout the National Military Establishment should be improved. For these purposes, the Commission recommends:

- a.* That more adequate and effective relations be developed at the working level among the appropriate committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the one hand and the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Research and Development Board, Munitions Board, and the National Security Resources Board on the other hand.
- b.* That the jurisdiction and activities of the National Security Resources Board be further defined and clarified by the President.
- c.* That vigorous steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency and its work.

The present system of military administration does not allow for interchange of military and civilian personnel in administrative positions. Economy and efficiency would be fostered by a flexible system permitting the use of military or civilian skills in the higher posts of military administration and the Secretary should have authority to make such shifts as circumstances dictate.

Supervision over military personnel is now vested in the service department heads and in the President, not in the Secretary of Defense. There are, in addition, many statu-

tory prescriptions of certain administrative services such as promotion boards, retirement boards, and others composed of military personnel, all of which serve to restrict the authority of the Secretary and his top civilian administrators. Moreover, statutory specifications of the numbers and grades of military personnel to be assigned to specific organizational units limit the most economical utilization of available military manpower when conditions require transfers and changes among organizational units.

The Secretary should have full authority to organize personnel management throughout the Military Establishment for greater efficiency and economy, and present hampering restrictions should be removed.

### Medical Services

#### *Recommendation No. 5*

That steps be instituted to implement the recommendations which the Commission will file later concerning the medical departments of the three services, and their coordination with other medical programs of the Federal Government, as detailed in the Commission's separate report on medical services.

### Civilian and Industrial Mobilization

For the security of the Nation, the formulation of plans for civilian and industrial mobilization should be completed at the earliest possible date.

*Recommendation No. 6*

The Commission therefore makes the following recommendations:

- a.* That emergency plans for civilian and industrial mobilization be completed promptly and continuously revised.
- b.* That use of civilian advisory boards should be continued.
- c.* That full responsibility and authority for formulating stock-pile policy and for its execution be clearly determined and centralized.
- d.* That further steps be taken immediately under the President's direction to prepare plans for civilian defense. Such an effort will require the participation of many agencies of Government. Similar action should be taken under the President's direction with respect to internal security. No clear allocation of responsibilities has been worked out among the agencies involved. The Commission believes that the problem in this area is one of determining what needs to be done and designating administrative responsibilities.
- e.* That defenses against unconventional methods of warfare be developed promptly and more vigorous and active attention be given to psychological warfare.
- f.* That the economic warfare section of the National Security Resources Board develop a comprehensive economic warfare program aimed at supporting national security both in peace and war.



### Conclusions

These provisions should insure the full control and accountability of the National Military Establishment and the full subordination of the military to civilian control by establishing the Secretary of Defense as the principal assistant to the President in military matters, responsible to him and to the Congress for the conduct, efficiency, and economy of the National Military Establishment. Lines of command would be clear; interservice rivalries reduced by the fresh emphasis on the singleness of purpose of the total military effort; efficiency promoted and economy achieved through consistent policy and program, and through centralized control.

## Related Task Force Reports

The Commission has had printed volume I of the task force report and it is submitted to the Congress separately as Appendix G, National Security Organization. Other volumes of the task force report are submitted to the Congress separately in typescript.

### Acknowledgment

We wish to acknowledge the able service of the task force on National Security Organization comprising:

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## Separate Statement by Vice Chairman Acheson, Commissioners Mead, Pollock, and Rowe

We cannot agree with the recommendation of the other members as to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We feel this Commission should go one step further and recommend to the Congress the creation of a single Chief of Staff over the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The full Commission is, we think, in complete agreement as to the *problem* inherent in the present system of the Joint Chiefs. Our differences lie in the way it should be solved.

Stated simply, there are several major flaws today which are for the most part caused by deficiencies in organization. The existing structure operates to prevent our disinterested and able—indeed often brilliant—high-ranking military men from performing the best service of which they are capable for their country. We think these faults can be remedied by the improvement in organization and structure which we suggest.

As presently organized the Joint Chiefs are, for one thing, "too remote," to use the words of our task force report. They are remote from the control of their civilian heads, the constitutional Commander in Chief and his chief adviser and assistant in the field of national security, the Secretary of Defense. Our task force tells us also that they are remote from the civilian scientists who must try to arm them wisely for

the future—the Research and Development Board. They are remote from the Munitions Board which must arm them now and in the immediate years ahead.

For another thing, they appear to be too deeply immersed in the point of view of their particular services. Since they occupy dual roles—they are heads of separate services as well as members of the Joint Chiefs—they must, perforce, be advocates. The task force report has said:

. . . . the individual Chiefs of Staff have allowed themselves to be influenced far too much by considerations of service particularism and aggrandizement and have failed sufficiently to recognize and accept their responsibilities as an integrating agency of national military policy, . . . . individually they have been too heavily burdened with departmental obligations to give their important duties as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the time and thought that those duties demand.

We feel that only by the creation of the post of a single Chief of Staff can these faults be remedied. Essentially, they are the same—a lack of civilian control and damaging service rivalries—which by its findings the full Commission has recognized do exist throughout the military establishment. We think we should take this one step more. For if we are really to achieve economy and efficiency in the military the place to begin is here. As the annual report of the Secretary of Defense has put it, “the nerve center of unification lies in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

Just as the Commission has recommended centralizing authority in the Secretary of Defense (as in all other departmental heads), and has suggested adequate civilian staff assistance so that such control will be exercised effectively,

we likewise believe his control and authority should be bolstered in the military sphere by giving him the technical staff assistance he needs, in the form of a single Chief of Staff as his adviser.

If the President and the Secretary of Defense are to decide intelligently the civilian head must have staff advice responsive to him and not to one of three services. If the Congress is to legislate wisely, to appropriate judiciously, it must be advised from an *over-all* strategic point of view, not on the basis of a compromise of desires of three separate services.

A single Chief of Staff, with adequate staff, will, we believe, escape from the particularistic view of one service; a tradition aimed toward the over-all defense needs of the Nation will begin, and today's habit of advocacy will diminish and gradually disappear.

Civilian control can be either strong or weak. It is strong if the information on which civilians—the President, the Secretary, the Congress—must rely to make their decisions is objective and complete; and it is weak if these decisions must be made without such information. It is strong if there is a clear line of responsibility for carrying out these decisions, once made; and it is weak if responsibility is dispersed and accountability is proportionately diffused, as is the situation in the military establishment today. It is strong if the military program is unified to a degree so that the whole is stronger than the sum of its parts; and it is weak if the whole must be determined by civilians through attempts to judge the merits of separate service programs which do not mesh.

A President, a Secretary cannot judge wisely without professional aid directed at the problem as a whole and not at its parts.

We believe that a single Chief of Staff will strengthen, not weaken, the tradition of civilian control of the military, a tradition which is held most closely by our people and one which we think needs reaffirmation by action.

Accordingly we recommend the post of Chief of Staff for the Armed Services.

He would have staff functions only, *not* command functions. He would be a staff adviser to the Secretary who should make the decisions, and to the President whenever the latter so requires.

He would preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the power to initiate and terminate discussions. He would bring to the Secretary for decision the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs, including disagreements. He would give his own recommendation to the Secretary on such agreements and disagreements. In the absence of the Secretary at meetings he would give the Joint Chiefs the Secretary's views, if formulated.

The Joint Staff would be subordinate to him. He would have such personal staff assistance as the Secretary would decide.

He would be called the Chief of Staff and not "chairman," "responsible head," "principal adviser," or some other temporizing title.

We would emphasize his importance by his rank. His post should carry the most senior active rank in the services. Like all other officers, he would of course be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. His would be the post to which every young professional soldier, naval officer, and airman would aspire, instead of, as now, to be the head of a separate service.

He would advise the civilian policy makers on the over-all strategic problems they must take into account. In turn, he will be familiar with our national policy, particularly with national economic considerations and, at the direction of the Secretary, will transmit them down through the three services so they will become more economy-minded than they now are.

His awareness of considerations other than military, his over-all defense point of view, and his technical military skill would enable him to advise the Secretary on the military budget; he could distinguish the necessary from the merely desirable.

The solution we recommend is not new to the United States. In a previous period of our history it was tried and not found wanting. Elihu Root, when Secretary of War, found the cavalry, infantry, and artillery immersed in dangerous service rivalries and found himself making hard decisions without benefit of over-all technical advice. He recommended that the post of Chief of Staff be created in the Army. Through the years since it has often been filled by our most brilliant officers.



Today's problem while larger and more complex is, we believe, the same one. We feel its solution is so urgent, so vital to our national security, that we should not temporize any longer.

DEAN ACHESON.  
GEORGE H. MEAD.  
JAMES K. POLLOCK.  
JAMES H. ROWE, JR.

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